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Summary
Facing multidrug resistant (MDR) bacterial pathogens is
one of the most important challenges for our society. The
spread of highly virulent and resistant pathogens can be
described using molecular typing technologies; in particu-
lar, whole genome sequencing (WGS) data can be used
for molecular typing purposes with high resolution. WGS
data analysis can explain the spatiotemporal patterns of
pathogen transmission. However, the transmission be-
tween compartments (human, animal, food, environment)
is very complex. Interoperable and curated metadata are
a key requirement for fully understanding this complexity.
In addition, high quality sequence data are a key element
between centres using WGS data for diagnostic and epi-
demiological applications. We aim to describe steps to im-
prove WGS data analysis and to implement a molecular
surveillance platform allowing integration of high resolu-
tion WGS typing data and epidemiological data.
Keywords: next generation sequencing, whole genome
sequencing, molecular epidemiology, typing, quality as-
sessment, quality control, ring trial, surveillance database,
Swiss pathogen surveillance platform
Introduction
Facing multidrug resistant (MDR) bacterial pathogens is
one of the most important challenges for our society. The
rapid worldwide expansion of MDR pathogens may ex-
ceed 10 million fatal cases per year by 2050, exceeding
today’s cancer-related deaths [1]. In humans, MDR
pathogens such as extended spectrum beta-lactamase (ES-
BL)-producing or carbapenemase-producing Enterobacte-
riaceae are increasingly detected in the community and in
the hospital setting [2, 3]. Similarly, methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) represents an important
threat in the community and hospitals [4–6]. Specific viru-
lence factors such as Panton-Valentine leucocidin [7], tox-
ic shock syndrome toxin [8] or reduced susceptibility to
vancomycin have been associated with more severe clini-
cal courses and therapeutic failures [9, 10]. Overall, in hu-
mans MDR bacteria are associated with significant mor-
bidity, mortality and healthcare costs [11]. Today, MRSA
spread in hospitals could be reduced by a better under-
standing of transmission patterns [12] and the implementa-
tion of efficient surveillance strategies including screening
of high-risk patients and immediate isolation of colonised
or infected patients to interrupt the transmission chain [13].
However, these strategies have not been successful for all
MDR pathogens, as indicated by the overall increase in
resistance rates in Europe (http://www.ecdc.europe.eu [14,
15]) and specifically in Switzerland as reported by the na-
tional surveillance system for antibiotic resistance and con-
sumption in Switzerland[16, 17].
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The emergence of MDR bacteria in veterinary medicine
[18] leads to a high economic burden and constitutes a
reservoir of antibiotic resistance genes and of zoonoses
that represent a serious public health concern [19, 20].
Transmission events between domestic or farm animals
and humans have been described in the past by use of
various bacterial typing methods, including pulsed field
gel electrophoresis and, more recently, whole genome se-
quencing (WGS) [21–23]. These two compartments – hu-
mans and animals – are linked via environmental sources
such as sewage waters, farming, livestock and domestic
animals, and the food chain [24–26].
Recent technological advances in molecular epidemiology,
including high-throughput sequencing and data analysis,
now allow bacterial typing at higher resolution (whole
genome), and a better understanding of transmission rates
and routes within individual compartments [27]. In ad-
dition, WGS data show high portability, as genomic se-
quences can be shared and compared across centres, in
contrast to other typing methods [28]. However, only a
few studies have used WGS-based typing to link various
compartments, such as human and veterinary specimens
with environmental samples [29–33]. Such high-resolution
transmission information may close the current knowledge
gaps and help decipher transmission routes at higher spa-
tiotemporal resolution.
With the introduction of a country-wide molecular surveil-
lance database in Switzerland, we aim to (1) increase the
overall WGS data quality by defining common best prac-
tices for WGS typing analyses based on ring trials results
and (2) establish a Switzerland-wide molecular surveil-
lance platform for selected pathogens present in different
environments and circulating in both veterinary and human
settings.
Improving whole genome sequencing quality
on the way to an interoperable surveillance
platform
In general, the similarity of pathogens can be described
on a genomic, plasmid or protein level, and differences
can be visualised in phylogenetic trees, allowing the iden-
tification of closely related isolates [28, 34]. Short-read
(e.g., Illumina and IonTorrent) and long-read sequencing
technologies (e.g. Oxford Nanopore Technologies and Pa-
cific Biosciences) allow the whole pathogen genome to
be reconstructed [35]. Thereby, WGS provides significant-
ly higher resolution for determining transmission events
compared with classical typing technologies such as pulse
field gel electrophoresis or multi-locus sequencing typing
(MLST) [36–39]. With WGS data, several typing ap-
proaches can be used for isolate comparison: (1) variant
call of single nucleotide polymorphisms, (2) core genome
multi-locus sequencing type (cgMLST), (3) whole genome
multi-locus sequencing type (wgMLST), and (4) k-mer-
based grouping of the closest genome matches [40–43].
The choice of a reference genome is critical when sequenc-
ing data are mapped to detect variants for whole genome
reconstruction. In general, the choice of non-outbreak-re-
lated isolate might influence data interpretation. Differ-
ences in the selected reference genomes and sequencing
technology used can lead to differences between centres in
the quantification of isolate relatedness. Future needs are
inter-laboratory agreements on minimal sequencing qual-
ity requirements and a set of common quality markers.
With this we want to ensure that the critical quality aspects
such as genome coverage, average read-depth and base-
call quality are controlled within all submitted datasets.
The workflow to generate WGS-based phylogenetic data
includes a wet- and a dry-lab component. At the wet-lab,
specifically trained laboratory technicians register the sam-
ple and add available metadata in a laboratory information
system or a biobanking information management system.
Next, technicians prepare the sample, extract the DNA (or
RNA) in sufficient quality and quantity, prepare the li-
brary and perform the sequencing. At the dry lab, bioin-
formaticians start the data processing with quality checks
and analyse the WGS data using either a commercial or an
in-house developed bioinformatics pipeline in order to de-
tect and visualise differences in the sequence data. Qual-
ity checks (such as Phred Quality Scores, coverage rates,
proportion of core genes) at each step are crucial for reli-
able analysis results [44, 45], and the frequency and length
of contigs (e.g., N50) provide important baseline quality
surrogate markers for overall WGS quality. Results will be
interpreted together with clinical microbiologists, hospital
epidemiologists, infectious disease physicians and public
health experts.
For many pathogens, the analytical workflow is a major
bottleneck, especially since best practices and pipelines are
not available. The resulting delay can be associated with
higher overall costs and have deleterious effects on health-
care systems [46–48], such as a delay in making connec-
tions among individual samples during an outbreak. Nowa-
days, WGS data are either de novo assembled or mapped
against the genome of a particular reference strain, which
is the basis for reconstructing a phylogeny. This process
can be rather time-consuming and currently has a series of
uncertainties, including differences between bioinformat-
ics pipelines and pipeline specifications regarding quality
controls, lack of epidemiological metadata, unavailability
of non-outbreak-related isolates, etc. Because of these dif-
ferences, the Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics has initiated
a nationwide quality assessment ring trial focusing on bac-
terial phylogeny. Ten Swiss diagnostic and research lab-
oratories, representing all Swiss university hospitals and
several research groups, are currently participating in a
WGS-based bacterial typing ring trial in three phases, as-
sessing key aspects of sequencing, data analysis and clini-
cal context. Results of this ring trial will be published soon.
Similarly, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) has recently published an expert opinion
on WGS as a tool for public health surveillance of MDR
pathogens. The ECDC concluded that the establishment of
standards and systems enabling EU-wide use of WGS as
the method of choice for typing microbial pathogens will
replace other methods and that this will improve the ac-
curacy and effectiveness of disease surveillance, outbreak
investigation and evaluation of prevention policies [49].
Quality control of the sequencing procedure and standard-
isation of the analytical process will be a key element of
the ECDC initiative. Similarly, in Switzerland, the recent
ring trial initiative aims to improve the overall quality of
sequencing and subsequent data analysis.
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Molecular surveillance with spatiotemporal
resolution integrating epidemiological metada-
ta.
The increased knowledge on the biology of the pathogens
and their transmission has already contributed to important
insights regarding their pathogenicity and evolution. Still
unresolved aspects can be highlighted:
1. Identification of potential sources of transmission. For
example, which are the compartments serving as the
sources of resistant isolates? What is the role of food?
2. Uncertainties about the potential routes of transmis-
sion. For example, what are the (molecularly con-
firmed) nodes within the network between humans
and animals? What is the probability that resistance
is transferred from animals or from the environment?
What is the contribution of human-to-human spread in
the community? How are the compartments livestock,
community and hospital linked in a network of trans-
mission? What is the role of domestic animals in the
transmission chain?
3. Description of the consequences following pathogen
transmission. For example, what is the prevalence of
specific resistant subtypes such as. MRSA with de-
creased vancomycin susceptibilities? What are the
most prevalent subtypes of, for example, ESBL- and
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae and
why are they successfully persisting in the environ-
ment? Do particular virulent strains increase in fre-
quencies over time?
Different settings including humans, animals and the en-
vironment play a varied and complex role in transmission
events and dynamics. Phylogeny based on high-resolution
WGS data allows a profound understanding of the relation
between samples; however, for the transmission pathway
other information needs to be included, such as clinical in-
formation or additional microbiological testing of vectors
and surfaces. The transmission dynamics between com-
partments are very difficult to assess, in particular when
additional, less frequently sampled compartments are in-
troduced into the equation. Transmission rates and routes
depend on factors such as antibiotic usage in hospitals
and outpatient settings [50], social and behavioural aspects
[51], immunity of the host [52, 53], the particular patho-
genic species and its ability to survive and thrive in the en-
vironment [54, 55], which also involves genetic exchanges
between species [56–58]. On a large spatial scale (region
or nation), transmission events between the community,
hospitals and animal compartments are therefore complex
and poorly understood overall, notably because of limited
data on the transmission events and tracking between the
compartments. Thus, additional interoperable epidemio-
logical and clinical metadata are required to provide a bet-
ter understanding of transmission dynamics and to guide
containment of such MDR pathogens. This includes in-
formation on the time and geographical location of detec-
tion and invasiveness (screening vs infection), host (animal
or human), environment of detection (sewage, hospital or
food), specific microbiological features of an isolate (phe-
notypic resistance or virulence), etc. (table 1). Such infor-
mation should be integrated into genetic distance compar-
isons and phylogenetic analyses. Switzerland may serve as
a good model for the evaluation of such tools because of its
geographical location, small and medium size of hospitals
and already implemented monitoring of resistance in both
human and animals (anresis.ch).
Although WGS-based phylogeny and geographical data
have been combined previously at specific geographical
areas or around the globe (e.g., Francisella tularensis in
Norway [59], Mycobacterium tuberculosis [60], Salmonel-
la enteritidis subspecies [61], MRSA [62], and Zika [63,
64], influenza [65], Ebola [66, 67] and Lyssa viruses [68]),
the geographical resolution and dynamic aspects were of-
ten not sufficient to have a meaningful and immediate
public health impact. More recently, the microreact tool
(microreact.org [69]) was used to describe the spatial dis-
tribution of MRSA isolates across Europe [70]. A total
of 308 invasive S. aureus isolates were integrated into
the analysis, and the distribution of particular frequent
clonal complexes (CC5, CC22, and CC30) were discussed
[70]. The microreact tool allowed identification of high-
risk clones on the basis of population level properties such
as clonal relatedness, abundance and spatial structuring.
Epidemiological or mathematical models can be performed
with this tool.
Table 1: Important minimum interoperable metadata for a surveillance
database.
Description details
Pathogen
Species_type Bacteria; viruses
Species_name NCBI taxonomy name
Taxonomy_ID NCBI taxonomy ID
Sample
Isolation_source Human; animal; environmental; food
Isolation_source_detailed Site of isolation e.g., SNOMED CT for
human
Isolation_country Country where the sample was isolated
Isolation_date Date of isolation
Laboratory_ID Unique ID of the laboratory processing
the sample
Patient (if isolation_source == "Human")
Host_age Age of the patient
Host_sex Gender of the patient
Home_address_zip ZIP code of the patient’s home
Home_address_country Country of the patient’s home
Clinic Name of hospital/clinic where patient is
treated
Clinic_ward Ward where patient is staying
Clinic_room Room number where patient is staying
Study_ethical_consent Describes if patient signed a study ethi-
cal consent
Sequencing
Sequencing_lab_ID Unique ID of the sequencing facility/
laboratory
DNA_extraction_kit Kit used for DNA extraction
Library_preparation_kit Kit used for library preparation
Sequencing_platform Technology used for sequencing, e.g.,
Illumina MiSeq
Bioinformatics
Quality_filtering_tool Name (version) of the tool used for
quality filtering reads
Assembly_method Mapping-based assembly; de-novo as-
sembly
Assembly_tool Name (version) of the tool used for
genome assembly
Reference_genome Reference genome used for mapping
(FASTA format)
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Recently, Hadfield and colleagues developed a phylody-
namic analysis pipeline coupled to a web-browser based
interactive visualisation for pathogens such as Zika, Ebola,
influenza, dengue and measles viruses (nextstrain.org, see
fig. 1) [71, 72]. Nextstrain was designed to facilitate near
real-time analysis of pathogen sequence data. New data
can be incorporated within hours and the results are readily
disseminated via the web application. Nextstrain grew out
of the real-time surveillance application nextflu, which
provides phylodynamic analysis of influenza virus se-
quence and serological data in weekly updates
(nextflu.org). Nextstrain infers likely transmission events,
ancestral compartments, and divergence or introduction
times. The phylogenetic analysis is coupled to a geograph-
ic display of sampling locations and transmission routes on
a map. (See table 2 for a list of platforms and initiatives.)
Although these web-based platforms provide first impor-
tant steps, data analysis remained somewhat static and did
not allow prediction of the dynamic properties of an epi-
demic or outbreak, such as the basic reproduction num-
ber (R0), predictions of expected total cases within the
Table 2: Selection of surveillance databases, initiatives, and analytical
tools using whole genome sequence information from pathogens
Weblink
Database
Global microbial identifier http://www.globalmicrobialidentifier.org
Compare http://www.compare-europe.eu/
IRIDA http://www.irida.ca/
Innuendo http://www.innuendoweb.org/
Center for Genomic Epi-
demiology
http://www.genomicepidemiology.org/
Enterobase http://enterobase.warwick.ac.uk/
MLST databases https://pubmlst.org/
Analytical tools
Microreact https://microreact.org
Nextstrain https://nextstrain.org/
outbreak, modelling of spatiotemporal transmission events
including both human and animal strain information, or
identification of common genes associated with successful
transmission in a highly automated way. In addition, both
platforms are dependent on the upload of preprocessed cu-
rated and quality approved WGS and epidemic data. Ideal-
ly, a future surveillance platform would automatically pre-
assess data quality (genomics and metadata), and then ask
human experts for validation in all or selected (borderline)
cases. These are important gaps in current tools, which
have to be addressed to gain further insight into real-time
transmission dynamics. The requested key features for a
molecular surveillance database are summarised in supple-
mentary table S1 in appendix 1.
To date, there is no specific platform in Switzerland and
Europe that allows the integration of WGS data from vari-
ous diagnostic or reference laboratories, with a special fo-
cus on antibiotic resistance and virulence in combination
with spatiotemporal information and visualisations. Con-
sidering the impact of MDR on our society and the rapidly
evolving dynamics of MDR pathogens, there is a clear and
urgent need for such a platform.
Steps to the future of dynamic visualisation us-
ing genomic and phylogenetic data.
A key feature of such an inter-institutional platform has
to be the interoperability of sharable data. This can be
achieved with a common syntax and nomenclature starting
from data entry, species description and minimal datasets
of documented microbiological information. Databases
such as the NCBI taxonomy browser or the list of prokary-
otic names with standing in nomenclature (LPSN) provide
a definition for single bacterial species names. In addition,
healthcare focused vocabularies and ontologies such as
Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine - Clinical Terms
(SNOMED CT) or LOINC may offer detailed descriptions
Figure 1: NextStrain tool to analyse transmission of pathogens. (A) Phylogenetic tree of the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa. Colours
represent different geographic regions, and x-axis reflects a time scale during the outbreak. (B) Transmission dynamics modelled in real-time
with new viral strains based on WGS data.
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of the sample context, such as the anatomic site of isolation
(e.g., abdominal structure SCTID: 113345001) and the
source material (e.g., urine SCTID: 122575003). The us-
age of such controlled languages will be one of the most
critical aspects in connecting different centres and databas-
es to ensure efficient exchange [73]. As previously men-
tioned, we would envision using the recently defined
biobanking minimal description set for microbes, which
was established within the microbiology working group of
the Swiss Biobanking Platform (see table 1).
Not only epidemiological relatedness can be extracted
from WGS data. Virulence and antibiotic resistance could
also be assessed. Various web-based tools and databases
exist [74], providing data on virulence and resistance. Ex-
amples are SARG [75], VFDB [76–78], ResFinder [79,
80], PointFinder [81], or Card [82, 83]. Tools such as
PanGenome allow rapidly searching and comparison of
genetic information on a whole genome scale within single
strains or larger clusters of isolates (www.pangenome.de
[84]). Thereby the phylogeny of multiple resistance genes
and virulence factors can be analysed. In combination with
a spatiotemporal surveillance tool this would provide valu-
able information for rapid assessment of virulence and re-
sistance, and prediction of the dynamics of potential out-
breaks at an early stage. Next, it would allow the
identification of specific epidemiological markers almost
in real time. In addition, WGS data can be easily re-
analysed once improved tools and databases are in place.
We anticipate that a shared interoperable surveillance plat-
form for molecular epidemiology between human and vet-
erinary medicine coupled to state-of-the-art automated
phylogenetic analyses will enable more complete and de-
tailed surveillance of MDR pathogens and generate action-
able results for public health policy.
Our goal is therefore to establish, as a first step, a Switzer-
land-wide surveillance database combining the NextStrain
and PanGenome tools. This will be started with S. aureus
as a proof-of-concept pathogen, because a large strain col-
lection and WGS data are already available. We then aim
to gradually expand to include different pathogens such
as ESBL-producing and carbapenemase-producing Enter-
obacteriaceae, stepwise inclusion of geographical regions
beyond Switzerland and incorporating specific public
health aspects such as food safety.
Such a platform will be of immense benefit to public health
and research institutions in Switzerland. It will allow us to:
(1) identify risks of MDR bacterial pathogens for hospitals
and public health in Switzerland, (2) describe and explore
these risks by predicting dynamics of spread, and (3) pro-
duce outcome control measurements of interventions, for
example by monitoring the reduction of particular clones.
In contrast to other existing resources, our project envi-
sions real-time surveillance functionality, including the au-
tomated modelling of transmission events, epidemiological
warning functions and linkage with high-resolution geo-
graphical data. Although a Switzerland-wide initiative, this
database could clearly expand outside the Swiss border and
might provide a unique tool enabling other participating
countries to identify risks associated with MDR pathogens
in other European (and non-European) countries.
Figure 2 shows the envisioned workflow for the surveil-
lance platform. After isolating a strain, collecting epidemi-
ological data and sequencing it, the user would upload raw
data and metadata into a central or local/private database
using the submission portal. As much as possible, this will
make use of controlled vocabularies and ontologies to en-
sure high quality microbiological, clinical and epidemio-
logical metadata. After submission, the data are quality
controlled and then (semi)-automatically processed, with
genome assembly, as well as MLST, single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) and resistance calling. The result-
ing data are used for phylogenetic comparison and predic-
tive modelling. All data will be stored in a structured inter-
operable database with controlled access, which would be
queried by NextStrain/PanGenome-MRSA for the users to
visualise and interact with the data in a user-friendly fash-
ion. If open access, the structured database may also be
used/queried by other apps or pushed to external databas-
es and knowledge bases. Special attention will be paid to
the choice of the operational platform technology, to the
backwards compatibility of the analysis tools and to tech-
nological developments such as upcoming novel sequenc-
ing technologies and file formats. In addition to the sub-
mission portal, an administration portal will be developed,
to manage users and rights, as well as a curation portal to
edit and control vocabularies and to define curated refer-
ence strains and genes/variants (e.g., for resistance).
Figure 2: Envisioned workflow for the surveillance platform.
After isolating a strain, collecting epidemiological data and se-
quencing it, the user uploads raw data and metadata into a central
or local/private database using the submission portal. After sub-
mission, these data are quality controlled and then (semi-)auto-
matically processed, to perform e.g. genome assembly, and MLST,
SNP and resistance calling. The resulting data are used for phylo-
genetics and predictive modelling of e.g. transmission dynamics.
All these data are stored in a structured database with controlled
access, and visualised in a user-friendly interface. For open-data,
the structured database may also be used/queried by other appli-
cations or pushed to external databases and knowledge bases. In
addition to the submission portal, an administration portal will be
developed, notably to manage users and rights, as well as a curat-
ing portal to edit controlled vocabularies and define curated refer-
ence strains and variants (e.g., for resistance).
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Ethical considerations regarding epidemiologi-
cal surveillance
The ethical framework and, especially, crises regarding the
standard of care in disease outbreaks and pandemics are in-
creasingly discussed in the literature [85]. The recent Ebo-
la virus outbreak in West Africa [86, 87] and the global
spread of Zika virus [88] have raised a series of ethical
questions about outbreak preparedness and control.
From an individual’s point of view, ethical and patient pri-
vacy aspects need to be considered in the collection and
analysis of clinical and epidemiological patient data and
molecular typing of pathogens. Switzerland participates
in the Nagoya protocol and the declaration of Taipei of
the World Medical Association (www.bafu.admin.ch und
www.wma.net). In addition, the collection and use of data
for research is regulated via the Human Research Act
(www.swissethics.ch). These regulations define how pa-
tient-related data can be accessed and analysed. Detailed
geo-referencing data has to be protected to reduce the
chance of identifying a single individual hospital. Howev-
er, public health specialists should be able to access data in
the case of epidemic danger for a larger population.
From a societal point of view, the transmission and spread
of resistant and virulent pathogens have to be controlled at
an early stage [89]. Various stakeholder interests create a
broad range of needs ranging from quality control in local
hospitals to nationwide public health aspects. Although the
purpose of an epidemiological surveillance database has to
be focused on data sharing, the requirements of individual
data protection and public health focusing on the potential
impact of MDR and virulent pathogens have to be careful-
ly analysed and discussed [90].
From the scientist’s perspective, interoperable databases
collecting pathogen sequencing data allow prospective and
retrospective data analysis using state-of-the-art bioinfor-
matic methods. By design, molecular surveillance plat-
forms are multicentric and offer a broad geographic cov-
erage. Publically funded research institutions should aim
for open access publications and should be willing to share
raw experimental data. Since in the past single bacterial or
fungal isolates have been claimed as the “property” of the
collecting institution, in some centres collaborative work
with such isolates has been regulated by material trans-
fer agreements. In order to protect the intellectual proper-
ty of the participating institutions and scientists, data ex-
change and publication policies for work derived from a
common interoperable molecular surveillance platform has
to be discussed, in a contractual framework where nec-
essary. However, a global cultural change regarding data
ownership as more society focused is ongoing. In cases
of a public health interest, such as an outbreak, transpar-
ent data sharing would be a crucial element to stop further
spreading of a virulent pathogen.
Resulting requirements on data safety and data granularity
should be reflected in the architecture of a molecular sur-
veillance platform. For example, (1) the surveillance plat-
form should be accessible only via secured logins; (2) only
encoded data should be entered; (3) the patients informed
or general consent could be added into such a database; (4)
data access to sensitive information could be restricted to
specific user profiles, such as clinical microbiology, pub-
lic health, research, hospital epidemiology; (5) data access
for research should only be provided on ethical approval
of a study; (6) a governance board could be introduced to
reflect different stakeholder perspectives; and (7) the geo-
graphic resolution of data should be reduced, for example
from place of living to a larger geographic area such as a
city district, when patient anonymity can be compromised.
Scientific significance of shared molecular sur-
veillance data.
The developed platform will allow exchanging of relevant
molecular epidemiological data, thereby enabling a One
Health surveillance system for the transmission of data on
MDR pathogens of different species and environments. Al-
though mainly focusing on MDR pathogens, susceptible
strains will also be included to give some background con-
trols and to potentially investigate other aspects, such as
specific gene transmission. The detailed information on
relevant strains would be interesting for various stakehold-
ers:
1. Human and veterinary microbiologists could better un-
derstand transmission routes and develop new preven-
tion strategies at the most critical cross-points.
2. Public health authorities would have a nearly real-time
surveillance tool for a detailed assessment and tracking
of single strains but also large scale outbreaks.
3. Hospital epidemiologists, infection control specialists
and clinicians could connect outbreaks to potential
sources inside and outside of hospitals.
4. Regulatory agencies could link potential contaminated
products to improve patient safety.
5. Basic researchers could access the database and use the
available WGS data to develop more complex trans-
mission models, which go beyond an automated sur-
veillance.
The establishment of a Switzerland-wide, scalable and
flexible platform for molecular epidemiology would allow
monitoring of different MDR pathogens in near real-time.
Importantly, combining animal, food, human and environ-
mental isolates with geographic and phylogenic data will
allow the exchange rates between different hosts to be
modelled. As a first step, our interdisciplinary group will
develop and test a prototype and implement a production
version for a prospective evaluation period. Special atten-
tion will be devoted to ensuring that genomes can also
be analysed in a global context by comparison with exist-
ing databases such as BIGSdb, potentially contributing to
global monitoring of MDR pathogens. In a next step, ad-
ditional MDR pathogens would be added to this database
after a final improvement phase and consultation with ad-
ditional diagnostic divisions at the university hospitals and
in the private sector.
Such a platform covers a series of important aspects: (1)
knowledge gain regarding transmission events between
humans and animals, which will allow the identification of
critical nodes in the network and thus help the develop-
ment of improved and better targeted screening strategies
and reduce the overall burden of MDR pathogens; (2) gen-
eration of the first molecular epidemiological surveillance
database for Switzerland, linking the key players in the
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field; (3) public health institutions will have a high-quality,
near real-time surveillance tool for highly pathogenic and
multidrug-resistant bacteria; (4) general public awareness
about transmission events between compartments will be
raised; and (5) due to the high interest of all involved insti-
tutions in such a platform, there is a very high potential to
develop it into a sustainable tool for future epidemiological
surveillance.
A common shared database infrastructure, which allows
modelling of spatiotemporal distribution of a pathogen is a
key missing element across European countries including
Switzerland [49] and our initiative aims at filling this gap.
Thanks to this article, we hope to encourage a number of
federal and public health institutions and researchers to
join our initiative in order to make a unique, large and
useful platform for MDR bacteria tracking and to study
the evolution and the spread of these major public health
threats.
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Appendix 1 Minimum functional features for a future sur-
veillance tool
Table S1: Minimum functional features for a future surveillance tool
Submission portal
Submission of genomic data
Upload raw reads
Upload genome assemblies
Submission of metadata
Data entry using an online form
Data entry via uploading a structured text file
Use of controlled vocabularies, and ontologies where they exist
Possibility to enter missing, nonmandatory, metadata at a later stage
Quality control, processing, annotation and modelling of data
Quality control raw reads and assemblies to flag poor quality data
Typing (spa, cgMLST, SNPs)
Modelling of transmission dynamics
Annotation of resistance mutations and genes
Annotation of virulence factors
Visualisation portal
Colour-code strains according to different criteria
Phylogenetic tree
cgMLST-based tree
SNP-based tree
Branches lengths represent either time or divergence
Confidence intervals on branch lengths
Zoom in/out of the tree
Map of cases
Display cases and transmission links
Zoom in/out of the map
Resistance, virulence
Colour-code according to pre-defined resistant genotypes
Display presence/absence of resistance genes
Display presence/absence of virulence factors
Filtering
Filter-out displayed strains based on a combination of criteria
Search function
Interpretations
Annotate related strains (clusters)
Administration portal
Data curation
Maintain curated list of reference genomes
Integrate validated genotype-phenotype resistance associations
Define and update controlled vocabularies
Access
Several levels of access rights
Audit log
Secure login
Versioning
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